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WHO'S AFRAID OF WHOM? COURTS REQUIRE HIV-




Three recent appellate court decisions in California, Maryland
and Minnesota are cause for great concern among health care prov-
iders infected with HIV. These cases form the basis of an emerging
legal trend to require HIV-infected doctors to disclose their HIV
status to their patients.' Furthermore, non-infected patients may sue
HIV-infected doctors who fail to make this disclosure for emotional
distress suffered for fear of contracting HIV.2 The cases are unique
in that the patients need not prove actual exposure to HIV - they
are merely required to show that their doctors cared for them while
infected with HIV.a
These landmark decisions contrast sharply with AIDS phobia
cases that do not involve health care providers,' and differ markedly
* General Counsel, United Methodist Church; Former General Counsel, American Dental As-
sociation. The author wishes to thank Susan Moriarity Miltko for her invaluable assistance with
footnotes. The author also wishes to thank Marilyn Hanzal and Mark Rubin for reviewing this
Essay and offering critical comments.
1. Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), [hereinafter Kerins 1J, review
granted, 860 P.2d 1182 (Cal. 1993), transferred in light of Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993), 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994), transferred to and summary judgment
granted in, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) [hereinafter Kerins II]; Faya v. Almaraz,
620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993); K.A.C. v. Benson, No. C6-93-1203, C5-1306, C4-93-1328, 1993 Minn.
App. LEXIS 1201 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1993), review granted, No. C6-93-1203, C5-1306,
C4-93-1328, 1994 Minn. LEXIS 155 (Minn. Feb. 24, 1994), later proceeding, No. C6-93-1203,
C5-1306, C4-93-1328, 1994 Minn. LEXIS 841 (Minn. Oct. 14, 1994).
2. See infra notes 9-47 and accompanying text (discussing the three key cases).
3. See infra notes 9-47 and accompanying text (discussing the three key cases).
4. For cases recognizing a cause of action based on fear of AIDS, see J.B. v. Bohonovsky, 835
F. Supp. 796 (D.N.J. 1993); Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31 F.3d 1197 (2d. Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 130 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1995); Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1992); Petri v. Bank of New York Co., Inc., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Castro
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); Johnson v. West Va. Univ.
Hosp., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991); see also Debbie E. Lanin, Note, The Fear of Disease
as a Compensable Injury: An Analysis of Claims Based on AIDS Phobia, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
77, 77 (1993) (criticizing court's holding that a security officer at a hospital, who was bitten by an
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from "fear of' cases generally. 5 More importantly, they have serious
public policy implications - courts have opened the door to future
suits by patients who claim the right to be informed of other medi-
cal conditions affecting their health care providers, such as hepatitis,
tuberculosis and substance addiction. In addition, these cases fly in
the face of the efforts of public health officials to put fears about
HIV in perspective.6
Three alternative legal analyses are available to future courts
faced with evaluating these difficult, emotionally driven cases.7
These analyses would discourage needless litigation and support
statements by leading infection control experts that the risk of
transmission of HIV in a health care setting is infinitesimal.'
Part I of this Article analyzes the three key cases. Part II dis-
cusses the law of emotional distress as it may relate to this issue.
Part III discusses some public policy concerns raised by the three
decisions. Part IV briefly discusses the possibility of these cases be-
ing extended in the future. Finally, Part IV explores the merits of
the alternative legal analyses, and proposes that courts reject the
HIV infected patient, could not recover for mental anguish resulting from mere exposure unless
the exposure resulted in actual physical injury); accord James C. Maroulis, Note, Can HIV-Nega-
tive Plaintiffs Recover Emotional Distress Damages for Their Fear of AIDS?, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 225, 231-37 (1993); see also Susan J. Zook, Comment, Under What Circumstances Should
Courts Allow Recovery for Emotional Distress Based Upon the Fear of Contracting AIDS: John-
son v. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991), 43 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 481, 481 (1993) (discussing emerging case law recognizing right to recover
damages for mental anguish caused by fear of developing AIDS).
5. See generally Watkins v. Fibreboard Corp., 994 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1993); Nesom v. Tri
Hawk Int'l, 985 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1993); Moore v. Delaware Valley Health Network, Inc., No.
92-6109, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17920 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1993); Potter v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993); Giffear v. Johns-Manville Corp., 632 A.2d 880 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993); Howard v. Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 383 (Wis. 1974). See also
David Crump, Evaluating Independent Torts Based Upon "Intentional" or "Negligent" Infliction
of Emotional Distress: How Can We Keep the Baby from Dissolving in the Bath Water?, 34
ARIz. L. REV. 439, 439 (1992) (discussing negligent infliction of emotional distress as cognizable
remedy for mental suffering unaccompanied by physical injury); accord Scott Marrs, Mind Over
Body: Trends Regarding the Physical Injury Requirement in Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress and "Fear of Disease" Cases, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 1 (1992); see also Nancy Campbell
Brown, Note, Predicting the Future: Present Mental Anguish for Fear of Developing Cancer in
the Future as a Result of Past Asbestos Exposure, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 337, 363 (1993)
(discussing need for case law uniformity as to when a plaintiff can recover for mental anguish,
unaccompanied by physical symptoms, resulting from fear of developing cancer subsequent to
exposure to asbestos).
6. See infra notes 9-47 and accompanying text (discussing the three recent cases which require
physician disclosure).
7. See infra notes 136-50 and accompanying text (discussing the alternative theories).
8. John A. Molinari, Infected Health-Care Professionals: Healthers or Modern Day Lepers?,
Part I-Issues and Considerations, 14 COMPEND. CONTIN. EDu. DENT. 706, 709 (1993).
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notion that patients have a right to pursue claims for emotional dis-
tress absent actual exposure to HIV or other infectious diseases.
I. THE KEY CASES
A. Faya v. Almaraz
In Faya v. Almaraz,9 a Maryland appellate court held that as a
matter of law, plaintiffs may sue their HIV-infected doctor for emo-
tional distress caused by the fear of contracting HIV. Dr. Almaraz,
an oncologist specializing in breast cancer, performed surgery on the
two plaintiffs in 1988 and 1989, two years after he learned that he
had HIV. 10 At the time he performed surgery on one of the plain-
tiffs, he did not have active AIDS." Approximately two weeks prior
to performing surgery on the other plaintiff, Dr. Almaraz was diag-
nosed with cytomegalovirus retinitis, his first active symptom of
AIDS.'2
Almaraz gave up his medical practice in March 1990, and died of
AIDS the following November. 3 In December 1990, the two plain-
tiffs learned about Almaraz' illness in a local newspaper - almost
two years after the first plaintiff's last contact with him and over a
year after the second plaintiff's surgery.14 Both plaintiffs immedi-
ately underwent HIV testing, with negative results.' Five days after
reading the newspaper account of Almaraz' illness, the plaintiffs
filed civil lawsuits for compensatory and punitive damages against
his estate, his professional corporation, and the hospital at which the
surgeries were performed.' 6
9. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993),
10. Id. at 329.
11. Id.
12. Id. AIDS is the acute clinical phase of HIV, caused by a seriously compromised immune
system. Prior to the onset of AIDS, individuals with HIV typically are asymptomatic. Id. at 328.
The more common symptoms of AIDS include Kaposi's sarcoma, severe and prolonged yeast in-
fections and herpes, cytomegalovirus infections, tuberculosis, and pneumocystis carinii pneumonia.
Id. at 328-29 (discussing the disease and summarizing several key articles on the progression of
the disease). Individuals with asymptomatic HIV are able to continue their daily lives; the disease
does not impair their ability to perform the essential functions of their jobs, and without external
intervention no one would know the individual's HIV status by looking at, talking with, touching
or working with him/her. Id. Individuals with active AIDS also can continue to perform the
essential functions of their daily lives, until a crucial point, which is different in each instance, at







The complaints alleged typical tort theories of liability based on
emotional distress. 7 The underlying claim was that Almaraz had a
duty to inform his patients of his illness and that the hospital should
not have permitted him to perform surgery absent the plaintiffs' in-
formed consent. 18 The plaintiffs claimed severe emotional distress,
manifested by headaches, sleeplessness, anxiety, and other ailments
resulting from their discovery of Almaraz' failure to disclose and
their subsequent surveillance testing for HIV.19 They did not con-
tract HIV, nor did they claim exposure to Almaraz' blood during
their surgeries.2 0
The defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a valid
claim.2 ' Their motions were based on the position that 1) neither
Almaraz nor the hospital owed a duty to disclose (or discover) Al-
maraz' HIV status, 2) the plaintiffs failed to allege that HIV en-
tered their bodies during the surgeries, and 3) their injuries were
not compensable because they were based on a fear that never mate-
rialized into HIV. The trial court agreed and dismissed the
complaints. 2
The appellate court reversed, concluding that "it was foreseeable
that Dr. Almaraz might transmit the AIDS virus to his patients
during invasive surgery."23 As a result of this foreseeable risk, the
court held that Almaraz had a duty to disclose his HIV status
before performing surgery on the plaintiffs, in order to give them
the opportunity to decide whether to proceed under the circum-
stances.24 Almaraz' failure to make this disclosure led the court to
determine that the plaintiffs could pursue their claims of emotional
distress caused by the fear of contracting HIV from Almaraz.26
In reaching this conclusion the court relied on the American
Medical Association's (AMA) policy regarding HIV-infected physi-
cians. 6 In particular, the court cited a portion of the policy that
17. Id. at 330.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. HIV is a bloodborne disease - it must reach an individual's bloodstream to be trans-
mitted. For example, such as from a wound in the infected person that bleeds into a healthy
person, allowing the blood of both to co-mingle. Id. at 332 (discussing HIV transmission).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 330-31.
23. Id. at 333.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 334 (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DIGEST OF HIV/AIDS POLICY
[Vol. 44:483
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states (1) HIV transmission is a theoretical possibility during inva-
sive medical procedures; and, thus (2) HIV-infected physicians
should disclose their HIV seropositivity to patients before perform-
ing procedures that pose a significant risk of HIV transmission to
patients.27
The court also held that the allegations of harm from the fear of
contracting HIV were not unreasonable, even though the plaintiffs
failed to allege any mode of transmission.28 The court limited recov-
ery for this fear to the period between the time they learned of Al-
maraz' illness and the time they received their own negative test
results - a "reasonable window of anxiety." '29 Therefore, the plain-
tiffs' allegations were sufficient to survive motions to dismiss, and
they were permitted to pursue at the trial court their claims for
emotional distress based solely on Almaraz' failure to disclose his
HIV status to them prior to their surgeries. 30
B. Kerins v. Hartley
The next significant decision is the 1993 California appellate
court decision, Kerins v. Hartley (Kerins I)."' In Kerins I, Dr.
Gordon, a surgeon, performed abdominal surgery on the plaintiff on
November 5, 1986, and five days later received the results of testing
that confirmed he had HIV. 2 Gordon continued to practice
medicine for a period of time thereafter. In April 1988, he an-
nounced that he had AIDS during a televised news broadcast seen
by the plaintiff patient.3 The plaintiff immediately underwent HIV
testing and learned approximately two weeks later that the results
were negative.34 She then claimed that Gordon breached a duty to
disclose his HIV status as soon as he had knowledge of it, and that
she suffered severe emotional distress upon learning of Gordon's ill-
(1992)).
27. Id. at 337.
28. Id. at 336-37.
29. Id. This "reasonable window" was considered to be 6-12 months. Id.
30. Id. at 339.
31. Kerins I, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), review granted, 860 P.2d 1182 (Cal.
1993), transferred in light of Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993),
868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994), transferred to and summary judgment granted in, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d
172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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ness. 35 Gordon (subsequently his estate) and the other defendants
filed motions for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff was
not entitled to a recovery as a matter of law. The trial court agreed
and dismissed the action.36
The appellate court in Kerins I relied heavily on the ruling in
Faya and held that the plaintiff could pursue her claim of emotional
distress caused by the fear of contracting HIV.3 7 The court con-
cluded that her emotional distress became unreasonable (and thus
not compensable) once she 1) received reasonable assurance that she
had not been exposed to Gordon's blood; 2) received negative HIV
test results; and 3) had an opportunity to obtain counseling on the
accuracy and reliability of the HIV tests and on the remote possibil-
ity of seroconverting to HIV-positive status more than 19 months
after her surgery. 8 The court in this initial ruling concluded that
these elements of her claim required a factual inquiry, and thus,
summary judgment was inappropriate.3 9 The court engaged in a
fairly detailed analysis of the existing case law on emotional distress
based on the fear of contracting AIDS.40 It chose to follow the Faya
case in which the plaintiffs were not required to prove actual expo-
sure to HIV.41
35. Id. at 624.
36. Id. at 625.
37. Id. at 627-32.
38. Id. at 631.
39. Id. at 632.
40. Id. at 627-32.
41. On February 24, 1994, the Supreme Court of California issued a one paragraph order
transferring the case back to the Court of Appeal, with direction to vacate its decision and recon-
sider the case in light of Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993). Kerins
1, 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994). Potter was a fear of cancer case in which the California Supreme
Court adopted a landmark rule that damages for fear of contracting cancer could not be recovered
in a negligence action in the absence of physical injury unless the plaintiff is able to plead and
prove that the fear stems from reliable scientific evidence that is more likely than not that the
feared cancer will develop. Potter, 863 F.2d at 799-800. The California Court of Appeal in Kerins
I thus faced the arduous task of reformulating its decision. The appellate court issued its new
opinion on August 23, 1944, using the Potter analysis. Kerins II, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994). This new decision of great import is discussed later in the body of this Article.
In addition, on July 6, 1994, the California Court of Appeal decided Herbert v. The Regents of
the Univ. of Ca., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), involving a suit for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress stemming from a 3 year old boy's needlestick injury from discarded used
needles in a hospital examining room. Id. at 711. The court upheld the defendant's summary
judgment based on the Potter decision, because the scientific evidence was that the boy's risk of
contracting HIV was .5 percent (assuming the needle was infected, a fact which was unknown)
and thus significantly below the required "more likely than not" standard established in the Potter
decision. Id. at 713.
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A. K.A.C. v. Benson
In K.A.C. v. Benson,4 the plaintiff-patients of Dr. Benson filed a
suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleging that Dr.
Benson performed medical procedures, including invasive gynecolog-
ical procedures, while he was HIV-infected and had "oozing sores
on his hands and arms." '43 The Minnesota appellate court relied
heavily on Faya and Kerins I in concluding that the plaintiffs could
pursue their claims if they could show that "they were in the zone
of danger of contracting HIV, that they reasonably feared for their
safety, and consequently suffered emotional distress."" Whether the
plaintiffs were in this zone of danger was a genuine issue of material
fact to be determined in the trial court. 5
With respect to damages, the court agreed with the decision in
Faya that the fear of exposure to HIV is reasonable only from the
time patients learn of their possible exposure to the time they re-
ceive their negative test results . Finally, the court ruled that based
on the standard of care in the medical community, Benson had a
duty to disclose his HIV status to his patients before performing
invasive procedures on them. 7
Therefore, the court in K.A.C. found the decisions in Faya and
Kerins I to be strong persuasive authority, and it rejected without
discussion the other case law regarding exposure to HIV. The court
agreed that the plaintiffs' initial distress at hearing their health care
provider had HIV should not be dismissed as unreasonable.
42. K.A.C. v. Benson, No. C6-93-1203, C5-93-1306, C4-93-1328, 1993 Minn. App. LEXIS
1201 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1993), review granted, No. C6-93-1203, C5-93-1306, C4-93-1328,
1994 Minn. LEXIS 155 (Minn. Feb. 24, 1994), later proceeding, No. C6-93-1203, C5-93-1306,
C4-93-1328, 1994 Minn. LEXIS 841 (Minn. Oct. 14, 1994).
43. Id. at *5.
44. Id. at *10 (citing Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Minn. 1980)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at *15-16. It should be noted that the court concluded this period was consistent with
the periods allowed for damages in Faya and Kerins 1. Id. While this result is consistent with
Faya, it would appear that the Kerins I court allowed for a broader period of recovery, because it
encompassed an investigation of the surgery itself (to determine whether she was exposed) and
counseling regarding the reliability of HIV testing. Kerins 1, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 631 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993), review granted, 860 P.2d 1182 (Cal. 1993), transferred in light of Potter v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993), 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994), transferred to and
summary judgment granted in, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
47. K.A.C., 1993 Minn. App. LEXIS 1201 at *18. Interestingly, the plaintiffs' expert, Dr. San-
ford Kuvin, is a Florida physician who served as the expert witness in Kimberly Bergalis' lawsuit
against her dentist, Dr. David Acer, for transmission of HIV to her during dental care. For a
discussion of the Acer and Bergalis dispute, see Bruce Lambert, Kimberly Bergalis Is Dead at 23;
Symbol of Debate Over AIDS Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1991, at D9.
1995]
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II. THE LAW OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The traditional law of negligent infliction of emotional distress is
found in sections 313(1) and 463A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.48 The doctrine provides that a defendant is generally liable
for an illness resulting from emotional distress if she knew or should
have known that her conduct involved an unreasonable risk of caus-
ing the distress and her conduct actually results in bodily harm.49 A
plaintiff cannot recover damages unless she can show a physical in-
jury together with the emotional distress.50 The reason for this rule,
which in earlier years was followed by a majority of courts, is that
compensating for emotional distress absent physical harm would
burden courts and defendants, because distress that does not result
in physical consequences is likely to be temporary and harmless.6 1
Physical injury carries with it a certain authenticity that ensures the
distress is not imagined or feigned, and absent physical injury, the
fault is not great enough that a defendant should be required to
compensate for it.
52
In recent years, the doctrine has evolved significantly to accom-
modate changes in our society.53 The advent of toxic tort litigation
resulted in courts allowing recovery for emotional distress under cir-
cumstances that were not contemplated in the earlier years. A num-
ber of variations on the traditional rule have emerged, and an in-
creasing number of jurisdictions are permitting recovery without an




52. Id. § 436A, cmt. b (1965); see, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Mass.
1982) (finding that lack of evidence of physical harm precludes a cause of action for emotional
distress and anxiety when that emotional stress and anxiety result from an increased likelihood
that the plaintiff will suffer a serious disease in the future); Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer,
Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1526 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (finding that plaintiffs may recover for physical
injury resulting from emotional distress if the injury is "definite and objective," and not fictitious
and imaginary).
53. See Marrs, supra note 5, at 1-3 (discussing the increasing restrictions courts have put on
recovery under negligent infliction of emotional distress and the development .of the different theo-
ries for establishing liability: I) physical impact rule; 2) zone of danger rule; 3) foreseeable plain-
tiff approach; and 4) proximate cause approach); accord Paul V. Calandrella, Note, Safe Haven
for a Troubled Tort: A Return to the Zone of Danger for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 79, 90-100 (1992); see also Blanche Wilkinson, Note, Bystander
Emotional Distress Claims in Medical Malpractice Action, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoc. 605, 606-13
(1992) (stating that courts are beginning to allow bystanders to recover for negligent infliction of




accompanying physical injury. 4
The most common rule today is that a plaintiff may recover dam-
ages for emotional distress if the defendant's negligence would cause
distress in a reasonable person.55 A key element in toxic tort cases is
that the plaintiff has been exposed to a toxic chemical (e.g., the
plaintiff drank water contaminated with carcinogens from chemicals
disposed of by the defendant).56 The exposure creates a reasonable
fear (and consequently emotional distress) that the plaintiff will
contract cancer as a result of ingesting the chemicals.57 Real expo-
sure to the dangerous agent is necessary to make the fear reasona-
ble. A plaintiff would not be entitled to recover for the fear of con-
tracting cancer from drinking water absent proof that the water was
actually contaminated by some action or inaction of the defendant. 8
A. Emotional Distress and HIV-Infected Health Care Providers
The courts in Faya, Kerins I and K.A.C. easily and perhaps un-
knowingly stretched even the most liberal interpretations of the tort
theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress. As noted above, a
key element in contemporary toxic tort cases is exposure to a dan-
gerous agent that creates a reasonable fear of contracting a serious
illness. In all three cases, the courts did not require the plaintiff
patients to show actual exposure to HIV during their medical treat-
ment in order to survive motions to dismiss or motions for summary
judgment.59 This is a significant departure from existing tort law,
because in effect it eliminates actual exposure as one of the elements
of proof. If the courts followed these three cases in the context of
contaminated water, a plaintiff would be entitled to proceed to trial
with a fear of cancer claim absent proof that the water was actually
contaminated by the defendant.
The court in Faya acknowledged that it was not requiring the
plaintiffs to allege in their complaints any possible mode of trans-
54. See, e.g., Richard H. Krochock & Mark A. Solheim, Psychological Damages from Toxic
Substances: Problems and Solution, 60 DEF. CouNs. J. 80, 80 (1993) ("More and more jurisdic-
tions are sanctioning large emotional distress awards, even without an accompanying physical
injury.").








mission of HIV during their surgeries.60 The court briefly discussed
the type of proof that would be required if the plaintiffs were obli-
gated to show actual exposure. The plaintiffs would have to show a
failure by Dr. Almaraz to use appropriate barrier techniques during
the surgeries or some incident, such as a serious needlestick that
spilled Dr. Almaraz's blood during the surgery.61 This would allow
Dr. Almaraz' blood to be commingled with that of the plaintiffs.
However, the court reasoned that it would unfairly punish the plain-
tiffs to require them to allege an actual mode of transmission when
they lacked the requisite information to do so.6" The court in Kerins
I agreed with this relaxation of proof.6 3
The court in K.A.C. came close to requiring proof of exposure
when it ruled that the plaintiffs were obligated to show they were in
a zone of danger.6" This zone of danger test, however, was met sim-
ply by proof that Benson performed invasive procedures on them
while suffering from exudative dermatitis. They were not required to
prove that these procedures were performed by Benson without
gloves (and thus that he placed his injured hands in direct contact
with the bodies of the patients while performing gynecologic exami-
nations or delivering babies), that his gloves were torn while his
hands were in contact with the plaintiffs' bodies, or that he suffered
some injury while performing the medical procedures on them (pos-
sibly resulting in blood-to-blood contact).65
What led to this relaxation of traditionally and purposefully strict
tenets in the law of torts (i.e., not requiring the plaintiffs to plead
and prove actual exposure to HIV)? The decision in Faya is key,
since it was decided first and given significant weight by the courts
in Kerins I and K.A.C..
Two elements of the analysis of informed consent in Faya are
crucial to understanding the court's departure from traditional tort
60. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 336-337 (Md. 1993).
61. Id. at 337.
62. Id.
63. Kerins 1, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 630-631 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), review granted, 860 P.2d
1182 (Cal. 1993), transferred in light of Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795
(Cal. 1993), 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994), transferred to and summary judgment granted in, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
64. See K.A.C. v. Benson, No. C6-93-1203, C5-1306, C4-93-1328, 1993 Minn. App. LEXIS
1201, *6-11 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1993), review granted, No. C6-93-1203, C5-1306, C4-93-
1328, 1994 Minn. LEXIS 155 (Minn. Feb. 24, 1994), later proceeding, No. C6-93-1203, C5-
1306, C4-93-1328, 1994 Minn. LEXIS 841 (Minn. Oct. 14, 1994).
65. Id. at *8-11.
[Vol. 44:483
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theory. First, the court did not accurately examine how the doctrine
of informed consent should be applied. Ordinarily, the courts re-
quire informed consent whenever a risk is significant or material in
some way.66 The underlying concept is that patients have a right of
autonomy, and they need adequate information about medical treat-
ment before they can make an informed decision to accept or reject
that treatment. 7
The court's decision was driven in large part by the AMA policy
regarding HIV-infected physicians.6" That policy, however, was
adopted in 1992, after Dr. Almaraz performed surgery on the two
patients at issue and in the aftermath of the renowned Florida case
involving a dentist, Dr. David Acer, who is reported to have trans-
mitted HIV to as many as six dental patients. 9 At the time of the
AMA's consideration of this major policy, many members of Con-
gress, the media, and the American public advocated mandatory
testing of health care workers and informed consent, because of the
Acer case. 0
Two principles in the AMA policy are crucial in the Faya court's
analysis of informed consent. The first is that there is a "theoretical
possibility" that an infected physician might transmit HIV to a pa-
tient during invasive procedures.7 1 The second is that an infected
physician should obtain the patient's consent before performing pro-
cedures that pose a significant risk of transmission. 2
The court readily accepted these two conclusions without any true
66. See e.g., Sard v. Hard, 379 A.2d 1014, 1019 (Md. 1977) ("Simply stated, the doctrine of
informed consent imposes on a physician, before he subjects his patient to medical treatment, the
duty to explain the procedure to the patient and to warn him of any material risks or dangers
inherent or collateral to the therapy .... ").
67. Despite this uniform tenet underlying the doctrine of informed consent, the courts vary in
the 'test they use for determining whether any given risk is material or significant. In the context
of health care, some would ask what a reasonable doctor would disclose under the same or similar
circumstances; some would ask what a reasonable patient would want to know; some accept as
reasonable what the plaintiff patient would want to know. See Michelle Wilcox DeBarge, Note,
The Performance of Invasive Procedures by HIV-Infected Doctors: The Duty to Disclose Under
the Informed Consent Doctrine, 25 CONN. L. REV. 991, 997-1001 (1993) (discussing the courts'
application of the "professional standard" throughout the 1950's and 1960's and the development
of the "patient-oriented standard" in the early 1970's which requires that a doctor disclose all
information that a reasonable person in the patient's position would find material in making a
medical decision).
68. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DIGEST OF HIV/AIDS POLICY 1 (1992).
69. A Shameful Senate AIDS Vote, NEWSDAY, Aug. 4, 1991, at 33.
70. Id.




examination of their meaning in context. The court did not evaluate
the meaning of this "theoretical possibility" that a patient might be
infected by a physician with HIV. The mainstream scientific com-
munity agrees that the risk of transmission of HIV to a patient from
an infected health care provider is infinitesimal. 3 The Florida case
involving Dr. Acer is acknowledged by leading experts to be an
anomaly among the millions of medical and dental procedures that
have been performed over the past 10 years by HIV-infected health
care providers; no one truly knows what happened.7 4 The Faya court
did not expressly hold that the risk of transmission of HIV from
doctor to patient was a significant or material risk, as traditionally
required under the doctrine of informed consent. The court con-
cluded simply that the risk was a theoretical possibility.
75
Part of the analysis of informed consent, however, involves weigh-
ing the gravity of the potential harm. The court in Faya focused on
this part of the analysis when it noted that, "[w]hile it may be un-
likely that an infected doctor will transmit the AIDS virus to a pa-
tient during surgery, the patient will almost surely die if the virus is
transmitted. 17 6 The gravity of the harm, death, appears in Faya to
transform any theoretical possibility into a significant or material
risk; it is material simply by the fact that its only outcome, however
remote, is death. 7
B. Other Types of "Fear of' HIV Cases
The public hysteria about AIDS has led to a number of lawsuits
in other settings, where the plaintiff has claimed emotional distress
based on a "fear of" contracting HIV.7 8 The courts have generally
ruled that the plaintiff must show actual exposure to HIV in order
to pursue a claim for emotional distress.7 9 Perhaps the most re-
73. See Molinari, supra note 8, at 710.
74. Some have posited that perhaps Acer committed murder, but authorities have found no
evidence to support such a theory. Laurie Garrett, Dentist's Lethal Legacy: Gave AIDS virus to
patients in Florida, NEWSDAY, Aug. 18, 1991, at 4.
75. Faya, 620 A.2d at 334 (citing AMA policy).
76. Id. at 333.
77. Cf Doe v. Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628, 633-34 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (upholding a
dental school's decision not to allow an HIV-infected student to complete his standard clinical
studies, and noting that "to permit even an occasional death to occur because of a failure to
scrupulously guard the safety of patients would appear to be morally unacceptable and contrary to
the fiduciary responsibility of the medical profession").
78. See infra notes 80-104 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 80-104 and accompanying text.
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nowned case was Christian v. Sheft,80 in which Rock Hudson's
lover, Marc Christian, was awarded $14.5 million by a jury for his
claim of emotional distress, based in part on his fear of contracting
AIDS.81 Christian tested negative for the virus, but the jury con-
cluded that Hudson conspired with his secretary, Mark Miller, to
hide the truth about Hudson's condition. 82 While the case was emo-
tionally charged and perhaps subject to criticism for the size of the
award, the emotional distress analysis was sound: Hudson engaged
in unprotected sex with Christian, knowing that he was infected
with HIV. He thus exposed his partner to a deadly disease. 83 Here,
exposure was easy to prove, because it is well accepted in the scien-
tific community that unprotected sex with an HIV-infected partner
is an exposure.
Similarly, in Johnson v. West Virginia University Hospitals,
Inc.,8" the court permitted damages for emotional distress where the
plaintiff hospital security guard could show actual blood-to-blood
exposure to HIV through a bite inflicted by an infected patient.85
The guard tested negative, but the court determined his fear was
reasonable since he was exposed to and could have contracted the
disease.8" This case can be easily distinguished from Faya and its
progeny, because in Johnson, the informed consent doctrine is inap-
plicable. Importantly, however, the court did require actual expo-
sure to HIV by the plaintiff.
By contrast, in Neal v. Neal, 7 the appellate court affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of an action filed by a wife against her hus-
band for the fear of contracting a sexually transmitted disease.88
The wife was unable to prove that her husband or his sex partners
were infected, and therefore, there was no actual exposure. 89 Simi-
larly, in Doe v. Doe,90 the New York Supreme Court dismissed a
wife's action for fear of contracting HIV from her husband.9 The
80. No. C 574153, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct., Feb. 17, 1989).
81. Id. at 2-3. The verdict was upheld on appeal but the damages were reduced. Id. at 3.
82. Id. at 2-3.
83. Id. at 2.
84. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
85. Id. at 891, 894.
86. Id. at 894.
87. 873 P.2d 871 (Idaho 1994).
88. Id. at 876.
89. Id.
90. 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. 1987).
91. Id. at 599.
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claim was based on the husband's failure to disclose a homosexual
relationship.9" The husband, however, tested negative for HIV, and
the wife refused to submit to testing to validate or disaffirm her fear
of exposure.9 3 Both cases involved the notion that the defendants
should have disclosed extramarital relationships t6 their spouses,
much like the doctrine of informed consent to medical care.94 Un-
like in informed consent cases, however, the plaintiffs in Neal and
Doe failed to show actual exposure to HIV, and therefore, the cases
were dismissed.95
A number of other similarly situated plaintiffs have tested the
fear of AIDS theory to no avail. In Burk v. Sage Products, Inc.,9 a
paramedic was stuck by a used needle on a hospital floor occupied
by several HIV-infected patients.97 The plaintiff tested negative for
HIV five times, and he could not prove that the discarded needle
had been used on an HIV-infected patient. 98 He filed a suit for emo-
tional distress against the manufacturer of the syringe container,
claiming that he lived in fear of contracting HIV.99 The court dis-
missed the case, because the plaintiff could not show that he was
actually exposed to HIV-infected blood.1"'
In Funeral Services by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community
Hospital,"'0 a mortician and his wife sued for emotional distress
92. Id. at 596.
93. Id. at 598.
94. Id. at 596 (dismissing fraud claim against husband for failing to disclose to wife his homo-
sexuality and at "high risk" candidacy for AIDS); Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 876 (Idaho 1994)
(dismissing claim for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from wife's
fear that she may have contracted a sexually transmitted disease as a result of husband's extra-
marital affairs).
95. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 599; Neal, 873 P.2d at 876. However, in Neal, the court precluded
summary judgment for the defendant on a battery charge on the basis that the defendant's failure
to disclose his extra-marital relationship to his wife satisfied the lack of consent requirement for
battery. Id. at 876-77.
96. 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
97. Id. at 286.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 288; see also Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Serv. Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585
(Tenn. 1993). This case, which was decided after Faya and Kerins 1, distinguishes the two cases
and rejects their approach. The case involved a claim by a hospital patient's sister that she was
stuck by a used needle and feared that she would contract HIV. Id. at 586. She tested negative for
HIV six times over a three-year period. Id. at 586-87. She also could not show actual exposure to.
HIV. Id. at 594. The court held that because the plaintiff tested negatively for HIV and could not
prove that she had actually been exposed to the virus, she failed to meet the "actual exposure"
approach. Id.
101. 413 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991).
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based on a hospital's release of an HIV-infected body to his funeral
home for preparation without disclosing that the body was in-
fected. 10 2 The mortician had used appropriate infection control pro-
cedures during the embalming process, and he tested negative to
HIV four times.' 03 The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim, on the
ground that there was no evidence of an actual exposure to HIV. °4
It should be noted as well that the plaintiff easily could have shown
exposure, had it occurred.
The courts in Faya, Kerins I and K.A.C. distinguished these cases
with the simple conclusion that it would be unfair to punish the
plaintiffs by requiring them to prove actual exposure to HIV during
their medical treatments. 0 5 The courts did not explain why it is un-
fair to impose this requirement on a hospital patient but fair to im-
pose it on others, such as a paramedic stuck by a used needle.
The arguable difference between the patient-plaintiff cases and
the other "fear of" HIV cases is that, in Faya and Kerins I, which
involved surgery, the plaintiffs would not have personal knowledge
of whether an exposure to HIV occurred while they were anesthe-
tized. In addition, patients arguably cannot be expected to under-
stand what behaviors or incidents during treatment might expose
them to HIV, unlike the clear understanding by most people that
unprotected sex and used needles can create a genuine risk of
transmission.
These arguments have some merit. As discussed in the section be-
low, however, public policy considerations outweigh these arguments
and require that claimants in "fear of" HIV cases allege and prove
actual exposure to the disease in order to recover damages for emo-
tional distress.
102. Id. at 81.
103. Id. at 82.
104. Id.; see also Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 623 A.2d 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(holding that patient who underwent in vitro fertilization process and received placental blood that
initially tested positive for AIDS could not recover under negligent or intentional infliction of
emotional distress where the blood was later found to be AIDS negative). There is only one other
current case in which the court did not follow the otherwise consistent theme in this line of cases.
Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); cf Estate of Behr-
inger v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1271-72, 1279 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1991) (holding that the defendant-hospital breached its duty of confidentiality when it widely
disseminated the HIV-positive status of a physician who was both a patient and a staff member of
the hospital, but that the hospital acted appropriately in restricting the physician's staff privileges
because of the risk, however slight, that the physician may have transmitted HIV to patients).
105. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337 (Md. 1991).
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III. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Although the decisions in Faya, Kerins I and K.A.C. arguably do
nothing more than allow the trial courts to hear these cases, the
courts by implication adopted two significant public policies. First,
patients have an actionable right to know if their physicians have
HIV. Second, patients need not prove actual exposure to HIV in
order to recover damages for emotional distress. There can be little
doubt that these two public policies would be supported by the vast
majority of the American public, which is terrified by this dreaded
disease.106
The decisions, however, also have public policy implications that
go far beyond the specific rulings. While it is possible that the
courts may have weighed these other policy considerations, their
opinions do not hint of such examination. Most importantly, the
courts did not consider the privacy rights of the physicians. Any
HIV-infected physician or dentist who discloses her HIV-positive
status to patients will likely face a barrage of complex legal and
practical difficulties. Patients may abandon the physician's medical
practice for fear of contracting the disease. The physician may have
difficulty selling his practice to another physician, since the practice
has been stigmatized as dangerous.1 0 7 It may be difficult to maintain
professional liability insurance coverage, because the carrier may
view HIV as an illness (or disability) that impairs the physician's
ability to practice medicine. Litigious patients likely will file "fear
of" lawsuits anyway, some challenging that the physician failed to
make the disclosure soon enough. Painfully personal, the media may
seize upon the disclosure as a newsworthy event, parading the physi-
cian's private medical condition before the public, family, friends,
106. Doctors with AIDS: Fears vs. Facts, Cm. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1991, at C12; Barbara Gerbert
et al., Physicians and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: What Patients Think About
Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Medical Practice, 262 JAMA 1969 (1989), Joseph Kirby,
AIDS fears shaping health-care choices, CI. TRIB., Aug. 19, 1991, at CI; cf. Estate of Behr-
inger, 592 A.2d at 1271-72, 1279 (finding that hospital breached its duty of confidentiality when
it made accessible the records of an HIV-infected patient who was also a physician at the hospital,
but found that the hospital correctly restricted the physician's surgical privileges due to the possi-
ble risk of HIV transmission to patients).
107. Some buyers of medical practices now request an attestation from the seller that s/he is
not infected with HIV, because of the fear of a serious adverse economic impact on the practice if
it becomes known that the seller has HIV. See Harlene Ellin & George Papajohn, Tests Help
Allay AIDS Fears in One Town, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 1991, at CI. For example, a young dentist
in a small town in Illinois had just purchased the dental practice of a dentist who was retiring
when the retiring dentist died of AIDS. Id. Patients for weeks thereafter canceled dental appoint-
ments for fear that they might contract HIV through the office. Id.
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professional colleagues, and acquaintances. Finally, in some commu-
nities there may be public health implications if doctors are driven
away (or patients stay away) because of a community's fear of con-
tracting HIV.
AIDS confidentiality statutes were designed to protect the privacy
of individuals with HIV, for these very reasons. 108 The disease car-
ries with it such stigma that confidentiality laws were enacted to
protect those who are infected from wearing the new scarlet "A" on
their foreheads, which would subject them to ridicule and scorn by
society. The policy behind the tort theories of defamation and inva-
sion of privacy is the same: our society values the pride, integrity
and autonomy of the individual, and the law generally protects an
individual's right to be free of harassment, shame and public ridi-
cule caused by others. Forcing an HIV-infected health care provider
to disclose her HIV-positive status to every patient contradicts this
important policy, especially when there is no consideration for the
type of care being rendered, the provider's compliance with infection
control precautions, the stage of the disease, or other important
facts.109
The ease of reaching the conclusion that Dr. Almaraz and the
other HIV-infected physicians were obligated to disclose their ill-
ness, without any consideration of privacy concerns, confirms that
the courts are not immune to the societal panic about this disease.
The courts effectively ruled that full disclosure is required, without
further analysis, if there is any possibility, regardless of how remote,
that HIV might be transmitted. The decisions might have been the
same, even had the courts considered the physicians' privacy rights.
After all, a patient's right to be free of harm outweighs a physi-
cian's right to privacy."' Had the courts given serious consideration
to these privacy concerns, however, they may have explored the is-
sue of risk (i.e., the real possibility of a patient being harmed) more
thoroughly.
108. See Roger Doughty, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information: Responding to the
Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic, 82 CAL. L. REV.
111, 122-28 (1994) (discussing how confidentiality of AIDS is an important means of fighting the
spread of the disease and promoting public health).
109. See In re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 634 A.2d 159, 162 (Pa. 1993) (finding that al-
though disclosure of the physician's HIV status was necessary to protect the public health, the
disclosure was also structured to protect the privacy interests of the physician).
110. SCOTT BURRIS ET AL.. AIDS LAW TODAY: A NEw GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 135 (1993); cf.
In re the Claim of John Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
there is a constitutional right to privacy regarding an individual's HIV status).
1995]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
The court in Faya, for example, made no effort to evaluate, or
direct the trial court to evaluate, whether the theoretical possibility
of transmission was a real risk to the two plaintiffs. The court ac-
knowledged that the virus is transmitted only if it reaches an indi-
vidual's bloodstream, which means infected blood must commingle
with healthy blood.111 The court should have applied this knowledge
to the case by requiring a factual analysis at the trial court level of,
for example, whether the surgeries were sufficiently invasive to con-
stitute a risk, whether the staff and Dr. Almaraz strictly followed
the infection control protocol recommended by the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDCP)," 2 and whether there were
any accidents during the surgeries that might have allowed the com-
mingling of Dr. Almaraz's blood with the plaintiff's blood. If Dr.
Almaraz followed infection control protocol carefully and no acci-
dents occurred during the surgeries, then there would have been no
opportunity for blood-to-blood contact with his patients and thus no
real risk of transmission of HIV to the patients.
Congress, the CDCP, and the state legislatures have balanced the
conflicting interests of patients and providers more delicately, de-
spite the intense public pressure to adopt guidelines and laws man-
dating that health care providers be tested for HIV on some regular
basis. 113 In 1991, Congress directed the states to adopt the CDCP
guidelines for preventing transmission of HIV to patients." " These
guidelines include the requirement or recommendation that infected
health care professionals report to a local expert review committee
for assistance in determining whether and to what extent their med-
ical practices should be curtailed to protect patients from the risk of
HIV." 5
In Michigan, for example, the Department of Public Health has
adopted guidelines that 1) require all health care workers to adhere
to appropriate infection control precautions, 2) advise health care
workers with exudative lesions or weeping dermatitis to refrain from
performing invasive procedures, 3) encourage all health care work-
ers to undergo personal assessments to determine their need for HIV
111. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 332 (Md. 1993).
112. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Recommendations for Preventing Transmis-
sion of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-
Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 19 (1991).
113. A Shameful Senate AIDS Vote, supra note 69, at 33.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2 (Supp. 1991).
115. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 112, at 19.
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(and hepatitis) testing, 4) encourage infected health care workers to
seek counseling to better understand the prevention of HIV and
hepatitis transmission and receive advice on appropriate special pre-
cautions, 5) encourage infected health care workers to seek appro-
priate medical care and periodic evaluation of health status, coun-
seling on the advisability of continuing to work in the health care
setting, and information on safer sex and partner notification, 6) in-
form infected health care workers that they must inform their physi-
cian and/or health care facility when there is a significant risk of
compromised health care, 7) and inform infected health care work-
ers who perform invasive procedures that they should practice only
after the evaluation, and with continued monitoring, by their per-
sonal physician and/or under recommendations of public health offi-
cials, expert panels, or in compliance with institutional policies that
are consistent with these recommendations. " 6 Interestingly, the
Michigan guidelines also include an excellent background discussion
of risk. It includes a note that the risk of transmission of HIV
should be placed in perspective with the other risks patients face as
they enter the health care system (e.g., 1 out of every 10,000 per-
sons undergoing general anesthesia dies; and 1-2 out of every
100,000 persons treated with penicillin have an anaphylactic reac-
tion resulting in death)." 7
As of January 1994, every state in the nation has either complied
with the federal law or sought an extension of time for compli-
ance." 8 As a result, HIV-infected providers are generally required
or encouraged to seek the guidance of an expert review panel as to
whether any restrictions on their medical practices are warranted.
The federal guidelines acknowledge that an HIV-infected health
care provider should not make the decision alone about whether pa-
tients are at risk; an expert review panel provides objectivity about
risk based on the panel's expert knowledge of the disease, the doc-
tor's medical practice, the status of the doctor's physical and emo-
116. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, MICHIGAN RECOMMENDATIONS ON HIV-
INFECTED AND/OR HIV-INFECTED HEALTH CARE WORKERS (1992).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-1IA-60 (Supp. 1993); S.H.A. 410 ILCS 325.5 (1993); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 85.201-85.206 (West 1994). Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska
and New Jersey have received extensions of time to comply with the law. In August 1994, New
Jersey announced its new policy, which is consistent with the Michigan guidelines. Infected Den-
tists Must Follow CDC Practice Guidelines, ADA NEWS, Jan. 24, 1994, at 34 [hereinafter In-
fected Dentists].
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tional health, and other factors. 119 Therefore, the CDCP, Congress
and, the state legislatures acknowledge that a number of issues must
be considered in evaluating the safety of the medical practice of an
HIV-infected doctor. The "theoretical possibility" that HIV may be
transmitted from doctor to patient is evaluated on a case-by-case
basis, and practice restrictions and/or disclosure requirement are
dictated only in those unusual cases where the expert review panel
forms the conclusion that such restrictions and/or disclosure are
warranted.
The AMA policy on HIV-infected physicians includes a state-
ment that infected physicians should report to a local expert review
panel or public health officer. 120 When read in its entirety, the
AMA policy appears to require a connected series of events. An
HIV-infected physician should first report to an expert review
panel.' If the panel releases the physician as posing no harm to
patients, then the risk evaluation ends. 22 If the panel recommends
restrictions on the physician's practice, based on the risk to patients,
then the physician should follow the restrictions or disclose his/her
status to patients before performing the procedures that pose a
risk.
23
The court in Faya failed to evaluate the AMA policy on infected
physicians in its entirety, and therefore, it did not conduct this type
of analysis. Had it done so, and considered as well the privacy inter-
ests of the physician, it might have reached a far different conclu-
sion. At the very least, the evaluation of conflicting interests would
have been more objective and fair to all parties in the litigation.
Another public policy implication of these three decisions is their
impact on the public's fear of HIV. This implication is most clearly
recognized in Kerins I. The defendants argued on appeal that their
position (supporting non-disclosure) was supported by the growing
body of case law protecting HIV-infected persons from unfair dis-
crimination.' 2" They cited several key California cases on this point,
119. Infected Dentists. supra note 118, at 34.




124. Kerins 1, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 629-31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), review granted, 860 P.2d
1182 (Cal. 1993), transferred in light of Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795
(Cal. 1993), 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994), transferred to and summary judgment granted in, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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in which HIV-infected persons were protected from discrimination
in the context of employment (not in the health care field), school,
and places of public accommodation. 12 5 The court rejected these
cases out of hand, on the ground that they deal with a risk of trans-
mission "so speculative that the fear of infection is unreasonable or
irrational."' 26
Infection control experts would not be so quick to distinguish the
two situations. They continue to reassure hundreds of thousands of
health care providers that using infection control procedures pro-
tects them from HIV-infected patients, even during the bloodiest of
surgical procedures. 12 7 Very few health care workers have become
infected with HIV occupationally over the past ten years, and the
transmissions have tended to result from significant injuries while
handling infected blood products, where there was an opportunity
for a sizeable amount of infected blood to commingle with the
health care worker's blood.2 8 It is generally accepted, moreover,
that health care workers are at greater risk of contracting HIV from
patients than the reverse.' 29
Finally, the courts may have encouraged frivolous litigation by
allowing plaintiffs to sue their doctors without any actual exposure
to HIV. In Faya, for example, the plaintiffs immediately filed suit
upon learning from a televised news broadcast that their doctors had
HIV, at the peak of their emotional trauma. 3 ' No one would doubt
the real horror that a patient would feel at that moment of discovery
that his surgeon had HIV. However, this real horror in Faya was
not based on any scientific fact; it was based on pure emotion. Al-
though the court thankfully limited the plaintiffs' recovery in Faya
to a narrow window in time, there is little in the decision other than
the limitation on damages that would discourage other plaintiffs
from filing a suit at the height of their anxiety. Once in court, it
125. Id. There is a growing body of cases from other jurisdictions supporting the same conclu-
sion. See e.g., Beaulieu v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662 (1992) (fining a Minnesota dentist $15,000
for referring an HIV-infected patient to an AIDS clinic). Most of the decisions are from local and
state human rights commissions. See, e.g., Application of Hurwitz v. New York City Comm'n on
Human Rights, 535 N.Y.S.2d 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 553 N.Y.S.2d
323 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), and pet. for rev. den., 558 N.Y.S.2d 891 (N.Y. 1990).
126. Kerins 1, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 629.
127. See Molinari, supra note 8, at 709.
128. Id.
129. id.
130. Faya v. Almarez, 620 A.2d 327, 329 (Md. 1993).
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would be difficult to "channel the jury's discretion '"" s
The sad reality of the fact that these three cases have opened the
door to frivolous litigation is the $850,000 settlement of a "fear of"
class action suit against the employer of a dentist from Georgia who
died of AIDS."3 2 The trial court denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, and within several months the case settled for
this amount.'
IV. THE RISK OF EXTENSION OF THESE CASES IN THE FUTURE
Given the fact that the courts in Kerins I and K.A.C. so readily
adopted the analysis and conclusions in Faya, it is reasonable to as-
sume that future courts will follow as well. Therefore, there is a risk
that future professional liability cases will focus on other health is-
sues involving the provider. Disclosure also may be required of those
with histories of alcoholism, drug abuse, and schizophrenic episodes,
or those with cataracts or heart disease.
Taken to extremes, it is imaginable that patients may require a
complete health history of their doctors when making a first ap-
pointment and annually thereafter. Licensing boards may be ex-
pected to review a practitioner's health as a condition of license re-
newal each year. Managed care plans and hospitals may require a
health history, including disclosure of HIV status, when providers
sign up or join a staff. Liability insurance carriers may deny cover-
age. The door has been opened. It is impossible to predict how wide,
but ingenious plaintiffs' attorneys will continue to push the limits.
These decisions and others like it may ultimately be used by
places of public accommodation to defend against claims that they
have violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act.' 34
The Act makes an exception for activities that pose a "direct
131. Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Serv., 868 S.W.2d 585, 593 (Tenn. 1993).
132. Patients of dentist who died of AIDS to split $850,000, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 7, 1994,
at D4.; Suit settled over dentist who died of AIDS, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 1994, at 14. The settle-
ment has stunned dentist employers in Georgia, who now fear their own liability exposure for the
disease status of their employees. It will take years for these issues to be resolved in Georgia. In
the meantime, employers of health care workers will be asking whether they should require all
employees to be tested regularly for HIV; whether they should reassign or terminate infected
employees; and how they should weigh their potentially conflicting legal obligations to employees
under disability laws and to patients under state tort laws. Id.
133. Taylor v. Morrison Dental Assoc., P.C., No. X91-2445-H, slip op. at 5 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Apr.
21, 1994) (denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the count alleging inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress).
134. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 - 12189 (Supp. 1993).
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threat" of harm.135 Astute defense attorneys will try to use these
decisions to support the argument that the "theoretical risk" of
transmission is equivalent to a "direct threat" of harm, thus al-
lowing public accommodations (e.g., liability carriers; landlords of
medical arts buildings) to exclude HIV-infected health care provid-
ers from participation. In short, the courts in Faya, Kerins I and
K.A.C. took a legitimate scientific inquiry out of the hands of the
scientific community, and gave license to the world to do likewise.
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR FUTURE CASES
As the above discussion illustrates, Faya, Kerins I and K.A.C. are
inconsistent with the great body of emotional distress law. The Faya
court, which the other two courts followed, used the doctrine of in-
formed consent in an entirely new way. The doctrine is traditionally
used in the context of health care to require doctors to give patients
information about the procedure the doctor intends to perform.
With only one previous exception" 6 (which the court in Faya did
not even cite), the courts have not extended informed consent to
require doctors to provide patients with a history of their own physi-
cal or mental conditions.
There are innumerable theoretical risks of harm that can occur
during medical care; untoward events can happen at the hands of
the best and the brightest physicians. Furthermore, health care
providers routinely continue to provide care to patients with other
physical or emotional illnesses that could result in harm, and yet
they make no disclosure of these illnesses to their patients prior to
treatment. Upon reflection, it is difficult, if not impossible, to make
a reasonable distinction between a doctor's HIV status and other
illnesses (e.g., hepatitis B, tuberculosis, alcoholism, exhaustion, dia-
betes; cocaine addiction; heart condition, cataracts, Parkinson's Dis-
ease). The court's analysis might have changed had it compared
HIV to these other risks.
For the most part, these other risks are accepted by society as a
part of everyday life. Death from HIV is not tolerated in the same
way. It is unique because of its stigma as a sexually transmitted
disease, owned by the gay community, drug addicts and others. It is
perceived erroneously by the public as a disease that is transmitted
135. Id.
136. Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
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easily in health care settings, and through saliva, mosquitoes, hand-
shakes and shared household items. As a result of these stigmas,
perceptions, and fears, it may have been more difficult for the courts
in these cases to remove themselves from the emotion of this
dreaded disease.
Perhaps, moreover, the courts were not immune to the public hys-
teria surrounding the Florida transmission of HIV by a single den-
tist. This was not a quiet incident of a patient dying from anesthe-
sia; it was a national media event for over a year, with near daily
reminders to the world, including judges, that health care providers
were to be feared, not trusted.
The body of law on informed consent thus is devoid of reported
decisions analyzing whether a surgeon has an obligation to inform a
patient that he has cataracts; that he has schizophrenic episodes;
that he is addicted to cocaine; that he is a diabetic; or that he has
Parkinson's Disease. In short, it would appear that the courts tradi-
tionally have not examined whether a doctor's health status may
have affected her performance in a specific case. 37
It is not too late for future parties and courts to analyze "fear of"
provider cases quite differently. There are at least three alternative
approaches available that would avoid these negative public policy
implications while maintaining the integrity of traditional emotional
distress tenets. At the same time, a different evaluation would allow
patients exposed to a real risk of contracting HIV to pursue legiti-
mate "fear of" lawsuits.
A. Actual Exposure
One simple approach would be to require a plaintiff to prove ac-
tual exposure to HIV in order to prevail in an action for emotional
distress based on the fear of contracting HIV from a health care
provider. This type of analysis would be consistent with the deci-
sions in the "fear of" HIV cases involving situations other than in-
fected health care providers. It has the decided advantage of keep-
ing out of the courts and away from juries and judges the
emotionally driven plaintiffs who have filed lawsuits solely on the
137. It should be noted, however, that perhaps these cases exist and simply do not get analyzed
or reported. This could happen for various reasons. Perhaps plaintiffs' attorneys are not accus-
tomed to making inquiries through interrogatories and depositions to determine whether a plain-
tiff's injury occurred as a result of some physical or emotional condition of the doctor. Perhaps
these cases are settled very quickly, or perhaps no one ever finds out about the doctor's condition.
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basis of irrational fears about this dreaded disease.13 As a result,
our legal system would be upholding the overwhelming weight of
scientific opinion regarding the transmission of HIV. This approach
also would also save for litigation only those rare, egregious cases in
which a plaintiff's fears are reasonable because they are based on a
real risk of transmission of HIV. Finally, it would respect the pri-
vacy rights of HIV-infected health care providers by upholding their
right not to disclose their condition to their patients.
Unfortunately, however, this approach is easily criticized because
it fails to solve the difficulty of a plaintiff proving actual exposure to
HIV during medical treatment. In addition, many opponents would
posit that infected providers must inform patients of their status (if
they know) prior to performing procedures that reasonably could re-
sult in actual exposure, because allowing an actual exposure to oc-
cur would be a heinous violation of the provider's ethical duty of
nonmaleficence (do no harm). Six patients of Dr. Acer were exposed
to HIV and have contracted the disease, and one has died to date;
their circumstances alone support an emotionally compelling argu-
ment that allowing any exposure incident to occur is tantamount to
murder.
B. Expert Review Panels
Another approach is available that would solve these problems. It
would be more complex than a simple test of actual exposure, but it
would balance all interests adequately. The first step in this alterna-
tive analysis would be to determine whether the doctor has followed
state health department guidelines by submitting to an authorized
expert review panel for a consultation about risk. If a panel has de-
cided that the provider may continue to practice without restriction,
then the court should defer to the expertise of the panel and con-
clude that the provider had no duty as a matter of law to disclose
her HIV status to the patient prior to medical treatment, absent
proof of actual exposure to HIV. 189
138. The real life horror of this type of litigation is evident with Faya. By the end of 1993,
there were 30 "fear of" lawsuits pending against the estate of Dr. Almaraz. In 1993, 1,800 pa-
tients unsuccessfully attempted to have the court certify a class action against the estate. Former
Patients File $640 Million Lawsuit, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 29, 1993, at 5.
139. A defendant provider's compliance with the conclusions of the expert review panel could
be asserted first as an affirmative defense in response to a complaint by a plaintiff who alleges that
s/he suffered emotional distress from the fear of contracting HIV. Then, the defense could be
used to support a motion for summary judgment, supported by affidavits from the provider and
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If the provider has not submitted to an authorized panel, then it
would be appropriate for a trial court to allow a patient to proceed
with the case and submit expert testimony that the provider's ac-
tions put the patient at risk. The provider's failure to receive a
panel's blessing should not relieve a plaintiff of the obligation to
prove that the doctor's conduct posed a real risk of transmission. It
should, however, be sufficient to allow the plaintiff to survive a mo-
tion for summary judgment. The trial in this case would require the
help of expert testimony in place of the expert review panel to deter-
mine whether the doctor placed the patient at real risk (and, there-
fore, should have obtained a patient's consent before providing
care). Failure to submit to the panel could be used to support the
patient's claim. Alternatively, if the doctor has submitted to a panel
and ignored its recommendations to discontinue certain medical pro-
cedures based on risk, then the court might rely on the decision of
the panel and conclude that the doctor breached his duty to patients
and placed them at risk. Only in these instances would it be reason-
able to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of showing actual exposure
to HIV. Ignoring the panel's recommendations also might support
an award of punitive damages, for knowingly exposing a patient to
the disease.
The beauty of allowing courts to rely on the decision of an expert
review panel in determining whether a plaintiff should be allowed to
proceed is that it relieves the court of the obligation of making a
scientific determination of risk. It also alleviates the societal pres-
sure of performing an objective evaluation of risk in the context of
an emotionally charged case about a dreaded disease.
In order for this alternative to work well, several safeguards
would need to be firmly in place. First, reporting to a panel would
need to be mandatory. Currently, the trend is for the reporting to be
voluntary. 140 By making the panel's role purely voluntary, states
have opened the door for courts to downplay the importance of the
panel's determination.
Furthermore, panels should have appropriate safeguards to ensure
that they are performing their job properly. These safeguards are
important to protect both the public and the provider. For example,
providers should be required to consult with the panel on a periodic,
the panel's authorized representative.
140. Kevin Sack, Albany Plans to Allow Surgery By Doctors With the AIDS Virus, N.Y.
TIMES. Oct. 9, 1991, at Al.
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regularly scheduled basis. The panel should have the authority to
inspect a provider's workplace to ensure that proper infection con-
trol precautions are used. The panels should also be appropriately
credentialed with various types of specialists (e.g., individuals who
diagnose and treat patients with HIV and AIDS; infection control
experts; individuals who understand the nature of the provider's
practice).
Third, severe disciplinary action should be a mandatory response
to a provider's failure to comply with the panel's conclusions. Prov-
iders who do not comply should not be allowed to continue treating
patients, absent extraordinary circumstances that adequately ex-
plain their non-compliance and that do not place patients at risk of
transmission.
C. Kerins H
The last alternative also available to the courts was adopted in
Kerins 1141 by the appellate court when Kerins I was vacated and
remanded for further consideration in light of the California Su-
preme Court decision in Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., a
fear of cancer case. " 2 On remand, the court extended and applied
the Potter standard and determined that,
in the absence of physical injury or illness, damages for fear of AIDS may
be recovered only if the plaintiff is exposed to HIV or AIDS as a result of
the defendant's negligent breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff's fear stems from a knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or
scientific opinion, that it is more likely than not he or she will become HIV
seropositive and develop AIDS due to the exposure. 8
Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim could not go forward because
there was only a speculative possibility that she would develop
AIDS at some point in the future (less than 0.3 percent).'
Interestingly, the court in Kerins H also addressed whether the
case should be decided differently because of oppressive, fraudulent
or malicious conduct. The court again extended and applied the Pot-
ter standard's requirements for fraud or malice and determined that
141. Kerins II, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
142. Kerins 1, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), review granted, 860 P.2d 1182 (Cal.
1993), transferred in light of Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993),
868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994), transferred to and summary judgment granted in, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d
172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).




in addition to proving oppressive, fraudulent or malicious conduct,
the plaintiff must show that the fear is reasonable, that the exposure
has significantly increased the plaintiff's risk of HIV, and that the
plaintiff's actual risk of threatened HIV is significant.'48 The court
easily concluded that the plaintiff failed to meet this burden.""
Finally, the court in Kerins H examined the issue of informed
consent.14 7 The plaintiff argued that Dr. Gordon committed battery
by performing surgery without first disclosing his HIV status prior
to surgery.14 8 The court declined to examine the many social policy
issues at stake if it were to require (or fail to require) disclosure of a
physician's health to a patient in advance of surgery.4 9 Instead, the
court held that the plaintiff could not recover emotional distress
damages on a technical battery theory when her fear of developing
HIV was not based on a significant risk of contracting HIV.50
It remains to be seen whether courts in other states will adopt the
Potter standard, as applied by the court in Kerins II, in these "fear
of" cases against health care providers. The Potter standard is by
far the most favorable one for protecting the rights of infected prov-
iders and discouraging frivolous litigation. It may, however, prove to
be too liberal for widespread adoption in other states. The other two
alternatives to Faya, Kerins I and K.A.C. discussed above are more
moderate approaches that balance the interests of all parties in a
manner that should be fair and equitable.
CONCLUSION
The courts in Faya, Kerins I, and K.A.C. missed an opportunity
to establish important public policy weighing the interests of pa-
tients with the interests of HIV-infected health care providers. They
instead chose the easier route of allowing terrified patients to pursue
claims for emotional distress absent any showing of real exposure to
HIV. The courts failed to acknowledge that a patient's autonomy
(right to know) is in direct conflict with a provider's autonomy
(right of privacy). As a result, they did not balance these rights in
any meaningful way.
145. Id. at 179.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 180-81.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 181.
150. Id.
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The practical implication of these decisions is that infected prov-
iders risk significant liability exposure unless they obtain the consent
of all patients prior to treatment, regardless of the real risk of expo-
sure. The result of course is that these individuals will have no med-
ical practice, because they will have no patients to treat. The ab-
sence of any real risk analysis or consideration of the public policy
implications in these cases shows that judges are not immune to the
emotional panic caused by this dreaded disease and leads one to ask:
who's afraid of whom?

